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ABSTRACT
As governmental bodies rely on academics’ expert advice to shape
policy regarding Artificial Intelligence, it is important that these
academics not have conflicts of interests that may cloud or bias
their judgement. Our work explores how Big Tech is actively dis-
torting the academic landscape to suit its needs. By comparing the
well-studied actions of another industry, that of Big Tobacco, to
the current actions of Big Tech we see similar strategies employed
by both industries to sway and influence academic and public dis-
course. We examine the funding of academic research as a tool used
by Big Tech to put forward a socially responsible public image, in-
fluence events hosted by and decisions made by funded universities,
influence the research questions and plans of individual scientists,
and discover receptive academics who can be leveraged. We demon-
strate, in a rigorous manner, how Big Tech can affect academia
from the institutional level down to individual researchers. Thus,
we believe that it is vital, particularly for universities and other in-
stitutions of higher learning, to discuss the appropriateness and the
tradeoffs of accepting funding from Big Tech, and what limitations
or conditions should be put in place.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Imagine if, in mid-December of 2019, over 10,000 health policy
researchers made the yearly pilgrimage to the largest international
health policy conference in the world. Among the many topics
discussed at this hypothetical conference was how to best deal with
the negative effects of increased tobacco usage (e.g., tobacco related
morbidity). Imagine if many of the speakers who graced the stage
were funded by Big Tobacco. Imagine if the conference itself was
largely funded by Big Tobacco.
Would academics in the field of public health accept this? To-
day, most would find such a situation inconceivable — given the
clear conflict of interest. In alignment with Article 5.3 of the WHO
Framework Convention of Tobacco Control [39], policy makers
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would not look towards these speakers for advice regarding health
policy. Anything said at this venue regarding the effects of smoking
on public health would be met with skepticism and distrust. The
negative effect of Big Tobacco’s money on research quality has been
widely reported, and it is commonly accepted that private-interest
funding biases research [3, 11, 13, 45].
However, this is exactly what is happening in the field of machine
learning. Replace “health policy” with “machine learning”, “effects
of increased tobacco usage” with “ethical concerns of increased AI
deployment”, and “Big Tobacco” with “Big Tech” and you get what
is a significant, ongoing conflict of interest in academia. Yet this is
largely regarded as a non-issue by many of those in the field.
In this work, we explore the extent to which large technology
corporations (i.e., “Big Tech”) are involved in and leading the on-
going discussions regarding the ethics of AI in academic settings.
By drawing upon historic examples of industry interference in
academia and comparing these examples with the behavior of Big
Tech we demonstrate that there is cause for concern regarding the
integrity of current research, and that academia must take steps to
ensure the integrity and impartiality of future research.
2 BIG TOBACCO’S AND BIG TECH’S
PLAYBOOK
In this section, we will outline how Big Tobacco delayed and pre-
vented government regulation of their products by sowing confu-
sion and discord in the public and scientific community. We then
compare such strategies with the actions of Big Tech. Exploring
this evidence provides us with useful opportunities to recognize
how such actions can be used by subversive corporations.
2.1 Big Tobacco
In 1954, Big Tobacco was facing a decline in public opinion as
demonstrated and accompanied by the first ever decrease in demand
of their product following the great depression [11]. Just two years
prior in Reader’s Digest (which was a leading source of medical
information for the general public) an article entitled “Cancer by
the carton” was published discussing the link between smoking and
lung cancer as presented by recent scientific studies [36]. While
Big Tobacco internally acknowledged the conclusions drawn by
these studies [16, 22], the threat to share value once the public was
presented with this information was too large to leave unattended
[4]. In response, Big Tobacco released a public letter titled “A Frank
Statement” [43].
“A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” was a whole-page
advertisement run by Big Tobacco in 1954 in over 400 newspapers
reaching an estimated 43 million readers [11, 49]. Signed by various
presidents of Big Tobacco, the contents of the Statement stated how
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they “accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibil-
ity, paramount to every other consideration in our business” and
that Big Tobacco “always have and always will cooperate closely
with those whose task it is to safeguard the public’s health” [43].
This public relations campaign (run by public relations firm Hill &
Knowlton [5]) was part of a larger plan designed to both portray Big
Tobacco as friendly corporations looking out for their consumers
and purposefully sow doubt into the scientific research which was
showing conclusive links between smoking and lung cancer [10].
An important part of Big Tobacco’s planwas to “cooperate closely
with those whose task it is to safeguard the public’s health” [43].
This included the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Com-
mittee (TIRC), later renamed to Council for Tobacco Research (CTR)
in 1964 [49]. The stated purpose of this Council was to “to provide fi-
nancial support for research by independent scientists into tobacco
use and health” [49]. A statement by the CTR published in 1986
would boast “support of independent research is in excess of $130
million and has resulted in publication of nearly 2,600 scientific
papers, with eminent scientists thinking that questions relating
to smoking and health were unresolved (emphasis added) and the
tobacco industry will make new commitments to help seek answers
to those questions” [49]. While the presented numbers are factu-
ally true, the underlying motivation behind such funding remained
hidden until uncovered by litigation in 1998 [5, 25, 29].
2.2 Big Tech
Just like Big Tobacco, Big Tech was starting to lose its luster (a
trend which started in the second half of the 2010s [18]). Public
opinion of these large technology corporations was starting to sour,
as their image shifted from savior-like figures to traditional self-
seeking corporations. This was highlighted when it came to light
that Facebook’s platform was used by foreign agents to influence
the 2016 US presidential election [1].
In Mark Zuckerberg’s opening remarks to the US Congress he
stated “it’s clear now that we didn’t do enough. We didn’t focus
enough on preventing abuse and thinking through how people
could use these tools to do harm as well” [41], and that Facebook
was going to take their responsibility more seriously from now
on. His opening statement is analogous to “A Frank Statement”,
failing to recall how leaked internal emails stated that they were
aware of companies breaking Facebook’s scraping policy, explicitly
naming Cambridge Analytica [30]. It also failed to mention how
this was not the first, rather one of many, apologies made by the
CEO to the public for negative (often purposeful) decisions that
were discovered by the public [31].
Just like Big Tobacco, in response to a worsening public im-
age, Big Tech had started to fund various institutions and causes to
“ensure the ethical development of AI” [14], and to focus on “respon-
sible development” [48]. Facebook promised its “commitment to the
ethical development and deployment of AI” [19]. Google published
its best practices for the “ethical” development of AI [2]. Microsoft
has claimed to be developing an ethical checklist [8], a claim that
has recently been called into question [46]. Amazon co-sponsored,
alongside the National Science Foundation, a $20 million program
on “fairness in AI” [44]. In addition to these initiatives, Big Tech had
been busy funding and initiating centers which study the impact
of their work on society. Big Tech’s response to public criticism
is similar to Big Tobacco’s response: pump vast sums of money
into these causes. As such, we must purposefully approach such
contributions with caution to ensure that we are informed to study
and understand the underlying motivations, interests (including
financial interests), and conflicts of interest (perceived or actual).
3 DEFINING BIG TECH
It is difficult to succinctly define which companies are or aren’t "Big
Tech". In this piece, we started from the definition "large technology
corporation" but even such a definition can be disputed. There are
some companies that are undoubtedly "Big Tech" (e.g., Google, Face-
book) but the distinction is not so clear for all companies (e.g., Yahoo
(is it still big enough?), Disney (is it a technology company?)). The
final list of companies was arrived at through multiple discussions
and a final vote with various non-author parties.
For the sake of this paper the following companies were con-
sidered "Big Tech": Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple,
Nvidia, Intel, IBM, Huawei, Samsung, Uber, Alibaba, Element AI,
OpenAI.
The following companies were not considered "Big Tech": Disney,
Autodesk, Pixar, Adobe, Polaroid, Pfizer, Sony, Oracle, Cisco, Netflix,
Yahoo, VMWare, Activision, Pintrest, Yahoo. Our list is purposefully
more conservative than most would be. This is because it means
that all of the conclusions arrived at in the paper would still hold (if
not become strengthened) by selecting any additional companies.
4 BUYING ACADEMIA
Big Tobacco’s investment in academic institutions, Figure 1 (recre-
ated from [13]), helped (and continues to help [16, 47]) advance
their business in numerous covert ways. This troublesome trend has
been borrowed by Big Tech to “[groom] academic standard-bearers,
prominent academics who will drive younger peers in a direction
that is more favorable to the company” [21].
We observe four main goals driving investment into academia
by embattled industries (i.e., Big Tobacco and Big Tech). For these
industries, funding research in the academy serves to:
• Reinvent itself in the public image as socially responsible;
• Influence the events and decisions made by funded universi-
ties;
• Influence the research questions and plans of individual sci-
entists;
• Discover receptive academics who can be leveraged.
Below, we explore in detail how Big Tobacco and Big Tech have
employed this strategy to achieve a similar effect.
5 REINVENT ITSELF IN THE PUBLIC IMAGE
AS SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
5.1 Big Tobacco
Big Tobacco created its funding agencies in a seemingly impartial
manner. The CTR was advised by various distinguished scientists
who served on its scientific advisory board [10]. During its exis-
tence, hundreds of millions of dollars were provided to independent
investigators at academic institutions in the US and abroad [49].
There is no doubt that a considerable amount of quality research
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Figure 1: Various ways tobacco industry money can find its way into academia, (recreated from Cohen et al. [13]).
was done as a result of this funding. However, the majority of the
funding provided by the CTR went to research that was unrelated
to the health effects of tobacco use [7]. This contradicts the stated
mission of “tobacco industry will make new commitments to help
seek answers to those questions [i.e., the effects of tobacco usage
on health]”.
Why is this the case? Those responsible for funding, usually
lawyers instead of scientists [5], “would simply refuse to fund
any proposals that acknowledged that nicotine is addictive or that
smoking is dangerous” [5]. Furthermore, projects that would shift
the blame for lung cancer away from tobacco to other sources (e.g.,
birds as pets [15]) were sought out and funded [5].
However, the purpose in funding so many projects was to use
the act of funding as proof of social responsibility. This pretense
of social responsibility was presented to juries in multiple cases,
such as a cigarette product liability trial in 1990 Mississippi, during
which a list of all the universities and medical schools supported
by CTR grants was presented to jurors [7].
5.2 Big Tech
Similar to how Big Tobacco created the TIRC to provide financial
support to independent scientists to study tobacco and its influ-
ences on health, Big Tech has funded various similar institutions.
Founded in 2016 by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, IBM, and Ama-
zon among others, the “Partnership on AI to Benefit People and
Society” was “established to study and formulate best practices on
AI technologies, [... and study] AI and its influences on people and
society” [38]. Unfortunately, non-Big Tech members of this partner-
ship realized that neither “ACLU nor MIT nor any other nonprofit
has any power in this partnership”, leading members to conclude “
PAI’s association with ACLU, MIT and other academic/non-profit
institutions practically ends up serving a legitimating function”
[37].
In addition to this joint partnership where industry interests
prevail over public interest, each company comprising Big Tech
has also been working on its own individual PR campaign. Google,
in response to growing employee and public concern regarding
its collaboration with the US military and Pentagon, created “an
external advisory council” [2] which was later disbanded after a
scandal surrounding one of its proposed members. Microsoft has
created an internal committee to “ensure our AI platform and expe-
rience efforts are deeply grounded within Microsoft’s core values”
[35]. In response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Zuckerberg
promised that Facebook will create “an independent group to study
the abuse of social media in elections”, and that members will “be
independent academics, and Facebook has no prior publishing con-
trol” [41]. More recently, in light of growing concerns regarding
“fake news” and disinformation campaigns, Facebook announced it
was giving away $300 million in grants to support journalism, to
the ire of some academics [26].
While these efforts are likely to result in some tangible good,
looking at the history of Big Tobacco, we observe that they are also
used by Big Tech to prove their social responsibility. Just as Big
Tobacco leveraged research funding to avoid legal responsibility,
Big Tech has used a similar line of argument to avoid scrutiny,
demonstrated by Zuckerberg’s usage of “independent academics”
to congress, Google’s boasting of “releasing more than 75 research
papers on topics in responsible AI [in a year]” [17], and the founding
of one-sided partnerships to serve as “legitimating function”.
6 INFLUENCE THE EVENTS AND DECISIONS
MADE BY FUNDED UNIVERSITIES
6.1 Big Tobacco
Positive PR was not the only motivating factor behind providing
money to institutions. Evidence has shown that Big Tobacco gains
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undeserved influence in the decision making process of universities
that are dependent on them for money [12, 28].
For example, Imperial Tobacco withheld its (previously con-
sistent) funding from the annual conference at the University of
Toronto’s Faculty of Law as retribution for the fact that UofT law
students were influential in having criminal charges be laid against
Shoppers Drug Mart for selling tobacco to a minor [15].
Other, more subtle, effects of Big Tobacco’s influence on academia’s
decisionmaking is that of delayed decisions or institutional inaction
on tobacco control issues [13]. While this can be achieved through
funding threats, it is also possible through the planting or recruit-
ment of friendly actors in academia. Examples of this include how
the former President and Dean of law at the University of Toronto,
Robert Prichard, was a director of Imasco (a large tobacco company)
[13, 15]. In addition, Robert Parker who was the president and chief
spokesperson for the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers’ Council,
was also on the Board of the Foundation of Women’s College Hospi-
tal, a teaching hospital also affiliated with UofT [13]. The network
of such placements which have been documented in universities
across many countries [15, 24] demonstrates how a university’s
decisions could be affected by conflicts of interests.
Additionally, events sponsored by Big Tobacco (e.g., symposiums
held about second hand smoking) have been shown to be skewed
and of poorer quality compared to events not sponsored by Big
Tobacco [3, 6] but still are cited by Big Tobacco when supporting
its interests [3, 6].
6.2 Big Tech
Similar to Big Tobacco, positive PR is not the only motivating factor
for Big Tech when providing funding for institutions. In addition
to academic innovation and research helping advance industrial
products, all of this funding also gives Big Tech a strong voice in
what happens in conferences and in academia.
The top machine learning conference NeurIPS has had at least
two Big Tech sponsors at the highest tier of funding since 2015. In
recent years, the number of Big Tech companies at the highest tier of
funding has exceeded five1. When considering workshops relating
to ethics or fairness2, all but one have at least one organizer who
is affiliated or was recently affiliated with Big Tech. For example,
there was a workshop about “Responsible and Reproducible AI”
sponsored solely by Facebook. In the last 5 years, the only ethics-
related workshop at NeurIPS that did not have at least one organizer
belonging to Big Tech, was 2018’s “Robust AI in Financial Services”
workshop (which instead featured 4 heads of AI branches at big
banks).
Such a conflict of interest persists even when considering confer-
ences dedicated to examining the societal effects of technology. For
example, FAccT (previously known as FAT*) has never had a year
without Big Tech funding: Google (3/3 years), Microsoft (2/3 years),
Facebook (2/3 years)3. While the conference organizers provide a
1The sponsorship info for NeurIPS was obtained from the "Sponsor Information for
NeurIPS 20XX" page for each conference (e.g., https://nips.cc/Sponsors/sponsorinfo).
We only counted Big Tech companies as sponsors if they were sponsoring at the
highest possible level for the respective year.
2For each workshop, we gathered the list of organizers on the workshop’s website and
searched the web for author affiliations (both past and present).
3The sponsorship info for FAccT was obtained from the "Sponsors and Supporters"
page for each conference (e.g., https://facctconference.org/2020/sponsorship.html)
“Statement Regarding Sponsorship and Financial Support”, it’s not
clear how effective such a policy is at preventing the unconscious
biasing of attendees and researchers.
In public health policy, disclosure of conflicts of interests is sim-
ply seen as a mechanism to indicate the existence of a problem. We
believe, as argued by Goldberg et al. [23] “rather than disclosure and
management, the ethically paramount intervention targeted against
behavior of partiality flowing from [conflict of interests] is the idea
of sequestration. Sequestration refers to the idea of eliminating
or at least severely curtailing relationships between commercial
industries and [...] professionals”.
Furthermore, there is work [21] which demonstrates how this
funding further purports Big Tech’s views and what solutions are
and are not acceptable [32]. By controlling the agenda of such
workshops, Big Tech controls the discussions, and can shift the
types of questions being asked and the direction of the discussion. A
clear example of this was when, “[as] part of a campaign by Google
executives to shift the antitrust conversation”, Google sponsored
and planned a conference to influence policy makers going so far as
to invite a “token Google critic, capable of giving some semblance
of balance” [21].
Just like Big Tobacco, Big Tech has been busy building relation-
ships with leaders in academia. For example, the Vector Institute,
has as faculty members a Vice President of Google and the heads
of various companies’ AI branches such as Uber, and Nvidia. And
although the institute is majority funded by governments (about
one third comes from industry [42]), they have largely remained
quiet regarding any of the ethical issues caused by those providing
them funding. This is not necessarily because of their funders, but
it would be unreasonable to assume that the risk of losing a third
of one’s funding wouldn’t impact what the institute does in the
public sphere. This is despite having some of the most renowned
researchers on “fairness” in the field. In reality, fairness is relegated
simply to a mathematical problem. This formulation of existing
issues is in-line with the dominant “logics of Big Tech” [32] which
fails to consider the many questions and concerns raised by those
outside of Big Tech.
7 INFLUENCE THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
AND PLANS OF INDIVIDUAL SCIENTISTS
7.1 Big Tobacco
CTR purposefully funded many unrelated projects. However, there
can be no doubt that through the allocation of its funds, it directly
and indirectly impacted research questions and the direction of
research when it came to the health effects of smoking [5]. First
and foremost, Big Tobacco actively sought out to fund any research
that sought to shift the blame from tobacco to other sources [5, 7].
When this was not possible, Big Tobacco opted to steer funds from
exploring the health effects of tobacco to studying the basic science
of cancer [5]. By dropping the tobacco link, the research was viewed
as less threatening and therefore "fundable", and, in other words,
distracting scientists and the public by sowing seeds of confusion
and discord in the public and scientific community.
Other actions included threatening to “take out ads [...] that
point out the flaws of studies” in an attempt to shame scientists
and make working in the area against Big Tobacco a more difficult
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endeavor with no room for mistakes [28, 33]. Phillip Morris and
RJ Reynolds (large tobacco companies) also worked with elected
politicians to block the funding of scientists with opposing view-
points: ensuring “that the labor-HHS (US Department of Health and
Human Services) Appropriations continuing resolution will include
language to prohibit funding for Glantz (a scientist opposing Big
Tobacco)” [28, 34].
As most researchers have to seek out grants from funding bodies
to perform their research, it is quite likely that they would seek
funding from Big Tobacco or institutions under the sway of Big
Tobacco (such as NCI andHHS). To increase the chances of approval,
it is likely that such researchers would make changes to the types
of questions they would explore, as it has been made clear that Big
Tobacco would not be funding certain questions.
7.2 Big Tech
Just as many Big Tobacco-funded projects lead to tangible advance-
ments in science and the lives of people, the same can be said for
the majority of the work funded by Big Tech. Just like with Big
Tobacco, there is evidence that the types of questions being asked,
the types of projects being funded, and the types of answers being
provided are influenced by Big Tech.
Faculty Funding
A large portion of the way Big Tech gains influence over AI ethicists,
is by acting as a pseudo-granting body. That is, by providing a large
amount of money to researchers, Big Tech is able to decide what
will and won’t be researched. We show that a majority (58%) of
AI ethics faculty view are looking to Big Tech for money. This
means that Big Tech is able to influence what they work on as
researchers since to bring in research funding, faculty will be be
pressured to modify their work to be more amenable to that of Big
Tech. This influence can occur even without explicit intention of
manipulations if those applying for awards and those deciding who
deserves funding don’t share the same underlying views of what
ethics is or how it “should be solved”.
To demonstrate the scope of Big Tech funding in academia, we
explored the funding of tenure-track research faculty in the com-
puter science department at 4 R1 universities: MIT, UofT, Stanford,
and Berkeley. We show that 52% (77/149) of faculty with known
funding sources (29% of total) have been directly funded by Big
Tech, Table 1. Expanding the criteria to include funding at any stage
of career (i.e., PhD funding) as well as previous work experience,
we find 84% (125/148) of faculty with known funding sources (47%
of total) have received financial compensation by Big Tech, Table 4.
Both these percentages rise when we limit our analysis to faculty
who have published at least one ethics or “fairness” paper since
2015. With this criteria, we find that 58% (19/33) of faculty with
known funding sources (39% total) have at one point been directly
funded by Big Tech, Table 3. Expanding the funding criteria to
include graduate funding as well as previous work experience, we
note that 97% (32/33) of faculty with known funding sources (65%
total) have received financial compensation by Big Tech, Table 6.
7.2.1 Methodology. Of the 4 R1 institutions (UofT, MIT, Stanford
and Berkeley) we chose to study, two are private institutions (MIT
and Stanford), while two are public institutions (UofT and Berkeley).
Two of these institutions are on the eastern seaboard (UofT and
MIT) and two are on the western seaboard (Stanford and Berkeley).
For each of these universities, we gathered a list of professors
from their universities’ faculty listing for the computer science
department:
• UofT: https://web.cs.toronto.edu/contact-us/faculty-directory
• MIT: https://www.eecs.mit.edu/people/faculty-advisors/35
• Stanford: https://cs.stanford.edu/directory/faculty
• Berkeley: https://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Faculty/Lists/CS/
faculty.html
We removed all professors who were not both research stream
and tenure track or those who where emeritus.
For each professor, we assessed them according to the following
categories:
• "Works on AI?": This was scraped from the department’s
page where each faculties’ interests were listed.
• "Works on Ethics of AI?": This was defined as having at least
1 ethics of AI/societal impacts of AI paper published in the
past four years.
• "Faculty funding from Big Tech": Has this faculty won any
awards or grants from any of the companies classified as
"Big Tech"? This field could be responded to with one of Yes,
No or Unknown. Unknown was used to represent faculty
who did not have enough information published on their
website to allow us to make a conclusion. Of course, it may
be possible that those classified as "No" simply chose not to
list such awards on their personal websites, but we chose to
treat published CVs as fully comprehensive.
• "Graduate funding from Big Tech": Was any portion of this
faculty’s graduate education funded by Big Tech? This in-
cludes PhD fellowships and post-docs. Like before, this field
could be responded to with one of Yes, No or Unknown.
• "Employed by Big Tech": Did this faculty at any time work
for any Big Tech company? This includes roles as visiting
researcher, consultant, and internships. Like before, this field
could be responded to with one of Yes, No or Unknown.
Faculty Funding – Analysis. Our initial analysis explores direct fund-
ing of research by Big Tech. More specifically we use our collected
data to answer the question: Has this faculty won any awards,
grants, or similar awards from any of the companies classified as
"Big Tech"? Results for faculty with known funding sources is plot-
ted in Figure 2, with detailed results in Tables 1,2,3. Although we
compare all computer science professors against those in “Ethics of
AI”, we present faculty working in the area of AI to present what
may be a large confounding factor (i.e., Big Tech’s growing interest
in AI regardless of its Ethics).
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Figure 2: Bar chart presenting the percentage of computer
science faculty members who received (at any point in their
career) direct funding from Big Tech, stratified by different
areas of specialization.
Table 1: The number of computer science faculty who have
won funding, grants, or similar awards from any of the com-
panies classified as "Big Tech". The results are also stratified
by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 77 72 118
UofT 17 15 30
MIT 22 14 30
Stanford 20 16 25
Berkeley 18 27 33
Table 2: The number of computer science faculty working
onAIwho havewon funding, grants, or similar awards from
any of the companies classified as "Big Tech". The results are
also stratified by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 48 35 52
UofT 12 10 11
MIT 14 7 19
Stanford 11 8 10
Berkeley 11 10 12
Table 3: The number of computer science faculty who have
at least 1 “Ethics of AI” publication who have won funding,
grants, or similar awards from any of the companies classi-
fied as "Big Tech". The results are also stratified by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 19 14 16
UofT 4 3 3
MIT 2 2 5
Stanford 6 2 3
Berkeley 7 7 5
Faculty Association – Analysis. This analysis explores any direct
financial relationship between faculty members and Big Tech (past
or present). More specifically we use our collected data to answer
the question: Has this faculty won any awards, grants, or similar
awards from any of the companies classified as "Big Tech"? OR
Was any portion of this faculty’s graduate education funded by
Big Tech? OR Did this faculty at any time work for any Big Tech
company? Although we compare all computer science professors
against those in “Ethics of AI”, we also present faculty working
on AI to present what may be a large confounding factor (i.e., Big
Tech’s growing interest in AI regardless of its Ethics).
The purpose of such collection is not to imply that any past
financial relationship would necessarily have a detrimental impact
on the research of the scholar (i.e., we are not implying that gradu-
ate funding will affect a professor’s views 10 years later). Rather,
we believe that given the dominant views of ethics by Big Tech,
repeated exposure to such views may result in increased adoption
and be a means of subconscious influence.
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Figure 3: Bar chart presenting the percentage of computer
science faculty members who have at any point in their ca-
reer received direct funding/awards from Big Tech or have
been employed by Big Tech stratified by different areas of
specialization.
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Table 4: The number of computer science faculty who have
had any financial association with Big Tech (e.g., won fund-
ing, were employees or contractors, etc.,). The results are
also stratified by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 125 23 119
UofT 29 5 28
MIT 31 4 31
Stanford 32 5 24
Berkeley 33 9 36
Table 5: The number of computer science faculty working
on AI who have had any financial association with Big Tech
(e.g., won funding, were employees or contractors, etc.,). The
results are also stratified by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 75 10 50
UofT 19 4 10
MIT 19 1 20
Stanford 9 0 2
Berkeley 14 1 4
Table 6: The number of computer science faculty with at
least 1 “Ethics of AI” publication who have had any finan-
cial association with Big Tech (e.g., won funding, were em-
ployees or contractors, etc.,). The results are also stratified
by school.
Yes No Unknown
All Professors 32 1 16
UofT 7 0 3
MIT 2 0 7
Stanford 9 0 2
Berkeley 14 1 4
Funder – Analysis. Having shown the majority of faculty at these
four school have at one point been directly funded by Big Tech, in
this analysis we explore which corporations are directly responsible
for the funding.
Table 7: Top 6 Big Tech companies which contribute directly
to faculty research through grants, research awards, or sim-
ilar means.
All UofT MIT Stanford Berkeley
Google 44 8 13 10 13
Microsoft 25 3 5 9 7
Amazon 14 3 3 3 5
IBM 13 3 3 3 5
Facebook 13 3 3 4 3
Nvidia 9 5 0 1 3
Journal Author Funding and Association
To demonstrate the influence of Big Tech funding in driving discus-
sion regarding AI ethics and fairness in non-technical academia,
we performed a systematic review of all articles published in the
two leading non-technical journals: Nature and Science.
We find that of the 59% (10/17) of position papers ever published
regarding the ethical/societal impact of AI has at least one author
who was financially involved with one of these companies at one
point in time (including faculty awards and former consulting gigs).
7.2.2 Methodology. In both Nature and Science, we obtained all
commentary or prospective pieces published after 2015 that re-
turned as a result of the following search terms (𝑛 = 68):
• machine learning AND fairness,
• machine learning AND bias,
• machine learning AND ethics,
• machine learning AND racist,
• machine learning AND disparity,
We removed any articles that were not published by members
of the academy or industry (i.e., journalists for the respective jour-
nals). We subsequently identified 17 papers of the remaining 51
articles as focusing on both AI and societal impacts (i.e. "ethics" or
"implications" of AI and AI-related research).
At minimum these statistics4 demonstrate a perceived, if not
intended, conflict of interest between Big Tech and the research
agendas of academics. As a result, it makes sense that much of
the fairness work that exists holds the entrenched Big Tech view
that “social problems can be addressed through innovative tech-
nical solutions" [32]. We do not claim that opposing viewpoints
are not present in academia. However, opposing viewpoints are
likely to comprise a minority proportion of the work and discussion
presented at such workshops, conferences, and symposiums and
therefore the issue of the improper influence of Big Tech needs to
be considered and addressed accordingly.
8 DISCOVER RECEPTIVE ACADEMICS WHO
CAN BE LEVERAGED
8.1 Big Tobacco
Part of the strategy devised by Hill (of Hill & Knowlton) leveraged
skeptics within academia to sow doubt and foster distrust in the
scientific findings [10]. These skeptics were solicited, given funding,
and had their message amplified into the public discourse [9, 10, 40].
The result of such amplification resulted in new skeptics and the
emboldening of existing ones – something in linewith Big Tobacco’s
goals. Based on memos released during litigation [5], Big Tobacco’s
lawyers actively sought to discover academics whose research was
sympathetic to their cause with the aim of funding any research
that would allow them to claim that evidence regarding tobacco
and lung cancer was inconclusive, such as research exploring if it
was the keeping of birds as pets, as opposed smoking that increased
the risk of lung disease [5, 10].
In addition to these activities, fundingwas reserved for researchers
who would be used to testify at legislative hearings in favor of Big
Tobacco. In fact, there was a concentrated covert effort on behalf of
4The data for all analyses discussed in this paper can be requested from the authors.
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Philip Morris International to identify European scientists with no
previous connections to tobacco companies who could be poten-
tially persuaded to testify on behalf of Big Tobacco against proposed
regulation on second hand smoking [9]. This was part of the larger
Whitecoat Project which resulted in infiltrations in governing offi-
cials, heads of academia, and editorial boards [10, 28, 40].
8.2 Big Tech
Just as Big Tobacco leveraged its funding and initiatives to identify
academics who would be receptive to the industry positions and
who in turn could be used to combat legislation and fight litigation,
Big Tech leverages its power and structure in the exact same way. In
an article written by The Intercept, we discover that Eric Schmidt,
previously of Google, was advised on which “academic AI ethicists
Schmidt’s private foundation should fund” [37]. This is not a one-
time occurrence either. Schmidt also inquired to Ito (formerly of
MIT’s Media Lab) if he “should fund a certain professor who, like Ito,
later served as an “expert consultant” to the Pentagon’s innovation
board” [37]. Another example of this recruitment is a professor
at George Mason University, who had “written academic research
funded indirectly by Google, and criticized antitrust scrutiny of
Google shortly before joining the Federal Trade Commission, after
which the FTC dropped their antitrust suit” [20, 21]. Or consider
the case where Schmidt cited a Google-funded paper when writing
to congress without mentioning that the paper had been funded by
Google [20].
Such blatant and egregious interaction with academia harkens
to Big Tobacco’s Project Whitecoat. The name of our paper is an
homage to Project Whitecoat: Project Grey Hoodie is referencing
the buying out of technical academics. These connections are not
fully exposed or available to the general public or the majority
of academics and thus quite difficult to analyze because unlike
Big Tobacco there has been no litigation to uncover the needed
documents for analysis [12].
9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The conflict of interest in academia caused by external private
funding is a systemic issue which exists at the societal level, and
therefore we think that effective solutions will have to come from
policy (either governmental or institutional). It is important to
stress that our examination of individual researchers is not meant
to call their integrity into question. We think that the vast ma-
jority of work done in academia is done by well-intentioned and
skilled researchers. However, we have shown that the interactions
between academia and Big Tech especially regarding studying the
impact of technology on society are eerily similar to those between
academia and Big Tobacco in the late 20th century. The truly damn-
ing evidence of Big Tobacco’s behavior only came to light after
years of litigation [25]. However, the parallels between the public
facing history of Big Tobacco’s behavior and the current behavior
of Big Tech should be a cause for concern. Having been a part of
this narrative before, the academy is responsible for not allowing
history to repeat itself once again. Rephrasing calls to action from
the fight against Big Tobacco “academic naiveté about [technol-
ogy] companies’ intentions is no longer excusable. The extent of
the [technology] companies’ manipulation [whether intentional or
otherwise] needs to be thoroughly [researched and] exposed” [50].
It is also important to keep in mind that Big Tobacco and Big
Tech are different industries with different effects on society. Big
Tech is largely considered to have been a net positive impact on
society. However, as a result of their legal responsibility to their
shareholders to make profit (which is the same legal responsibility
as the tobacco industry), their behavior has changed to the point
that it needs to be regulated by governments around the world5.
There are many publicly proposed solutions to the societal problems
caused by Big Tech from breaking up the companies to (and hope-
fully including) fixing the tax codes such that public institutions
no longer need to rely on external funding to do their work.
While we leave discussion regarding such in-depth solutions to
a later work, we encourage the readers in academia to consider the
splintering of AI-ethics into a different department from computer
science. This would be analogous to how bioethics is separated from
medicine and biology. Such a separation would enable academia-
industry relationships for technical problems where such funding
is likely more acceptable while ensuring that our development of
ethics remains untainted by Big Tech money.
We understand that it might not be possible (and some would
argue undesirable) to completely divorce academia from Big Tech.
However, financial independence should be a requirement for those
claiming to study the effect of their technologies on our society.
Any change that is undertaken must be deliberate and structural in
nature. However, in the meanwhile, here are a few steps that can
be done right now to help decide future steps and questions:
• Every researcher should be required to post their complete
funding information online. Lack of information was the
biggest stumbling block to analyzing funding sources of
current academics and in turn the possible effect industry
has on academia. Any and all historic affiliations should also
be listed as to enable studying of research networks.
• Universities need to publish documents highlighting their
position regarding the appropriateness of direct researcher
funding from Big Tech. These documents should be created
to answer questions such as: Should Big Tech be able to
directly fund a researcher’s work? Answering yes implies
that Big Tech has the ability to dictate what sort of questions
public institutions should be looking at.While in certain tech-
nical problems this is appropriate, do the benefits outweigh
the risks? Should the decision be made at the institution
level or department by department? Maybe the answers de-
pend on scientists’ research area? What are some possible
alternatives? Maybe industry funding can only be directed
at departments and not individual researchers?
• There needs to be discussion regarding the future of the
ethics and fairness of the AI field and their dealings with
industry. Is it permissible to seek external funding sources
given the historical effects such funding has had on critical
work? How do we ensure that their work is not co-opted
by the industry to push agendas that are not agreeable with
societal goals?
5Former Facebook executive Tim Kendall’s congressional testimony states that in the
pursuit of profit, Facebook “took a page from Big Tobacco’s playbook” [27].
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• Computer science as a field should explore how to actively
court antagonistic thinkers. To undo the current group-think
in the fairness field computer scientists will have to forcefully
expose themselves to unpleasant opposition to their ideas
and meet this opposition with an open and receptive mind.
None of these points can be effectively done in a vacuum. Aca-
demics should interface with those who disagree with them and
view corporate initiatives with cynicism. While such discussions
may not be fruitful at first glance, it is critical they take place.
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